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Abstract
Background According to a growing body of literature, people are quite inaccurate in recalling past affective experiences. 
Nevertheless, the mechanism underlying this recall bias (i.e., the tendency to overestimate and/or underestimate positive 
or negative past emotional experiences) remains unclear, and its association with mental health has not been studied yet.
Methods We adopted a smartphone-based Ecological Momentary Assessment to monitor daily affect (n = 92) and investigate 
the association between affect recall bias, mental health and resilience.
Results While the tendency to overestimate negative affective experiences was observed in participants reporting mild 
depressive symptoms, positive affect (PA) overestimation as compared to PA underestimation was associated with better 
mental health (i.e. higher psychological well-being and lower depressive and anxiety symptoms) through the enhancement 
of resilience. Furthermore, positively biased participants (i.e. PA over estimators) benefited from greater well-being, even 
when compared to accurate individuals.
Conclusions While people appear to use retrospective PA overestimation as a strategy to enhance well-being and resilience, 
they are not likely to underestimate past negative experiences to feel better. Accordingly, owning an optimistic vision of 
the past may represent an adaptive “distortion” of reality that fosters people’s mental health. The clinical implications of 
cultivating PA and learning strategies to regulate both negative and positive emotions are discussed.
Keywords Cognitive bias · Affect recall bias · Ecological momentary assessment · Well-being
Introduction
In recent decades, one of the most studied constructs in the 
psychological field has been represented by emotion regu-
lation (ER) (Fernández-Álvarez et al. 2018), which refers 
to the process of down-regulating or up-regulating ongoing 
emotions in order to achieve desirable states (Gross 1998, 
2015). Although the previous literature mainly investigated 
ER in relation to negative emotions, there is now increasing 
evidence showing the importance of positive affect (PA) in 
many aspects of our life (Colombo et al., 2020a, b), and 
highlighting the importance of cultivating positive emotions 
(Carl et al. 2013; Diener and Seligman 2002; Lyubomirsky 
et al. 2005; Tugade and Fredrickson 2007). Accordingly, 
people adopt up to five different categories of strategies 
to regulate positive emotions (Gross 2015), which can be 
implemented either before, during or after the emotion-
generation process (Quoidbach et al. 2015). More specifi-
cally, the use of strategies to increase PA after the occur-
rence of an event has been extensively supported, and it is 
now widely accepted that recalling positive memories is an 
effective strategy to upregulate positive emotions (Mitchell 
et al. 1997; Wilson and Ross 2003), enhance emotional well-
being, and increase happiness (Bryant et al. 2005; Quoid-
bach et al. 2010).
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Nonetheless, the emotions experienced during an event 
do not necessarily match with the emotions prompted by 
the associated memory: The intense sadness experienced 
after losing a job, for instance, might be remembered less 
intensely (i.e. underestimation) or more intensely (i.e. 
overestimation) sometime later. This phenomenon, called 
recall bias, has received increasing attention in recent dec-
ades because of its correlates with adjustment to life events 
(Skoronski 2010; Walker and Skowronski 2009). Hedges 
et al. (1985) first showed that people tend to overestimate 
experienced levels of PA and negative affect (NA) when 
asked to retrospectively recall their general mood (i.e., not 
in relation to a specific event). In recent years, different stud-
ies have confirmed this overestimation bias in recalling past 
affect (Ben-Zeev et al. 2009; Colombo et al. 2019a, b, c; 
Kardum and Tićac Daskijević 2001; Thomas and Diener 
1990; Wirtz et al. 2003), and they have pointed to different 
factors affecting this mechanism, including beliefs, event 
reappraisal, contextual information, and personality traits 
(Levine et al. 2001; Robinson and Clore 2002; Safer et al. 
2002). Whereas the tendency to overestimate negatively-
valenced emotions has been interpreted as an adaptive evo-
lutionary mechanism to increase the salience of threatening 
events, which is essential for survival (Miron-Shatz et al. 
2009), it is still not clear whether the presence of a bias in 
recalling positive emotional experiences may play a role for 
mental health.
According to the Positive Illusion Theory, enhanced 
self-evaluations, exaggerated perceptions of control, and 
unrealistic optimism are adaptive mechanisms that improve 
people’s happiness, satisfaction in life, and well-being 
(Brookings and Serratelli 2007; Taylor and Brown 1988, 
1994). Indeed, holding positive illusions is likely to increase 
the perceived abilities to deal with stressors, thus enhancing 
motivation and enthusiasm while carrying out actions (Tay-
lor and Gollwitzer 1995). This, in turn, would make it easier 
to reappraise negative events and implement successful cop-
ing strategies (Brown 1993). Likewise, holding an optimistic 
past-oriented disposition (i.e., overestimating past affective 
experiences) may represent a sort of strategy to maintain and 
upregulate positive emotions over time (Bryant 1989), which 
in turn could increase people’s resilience and perceived cop-
ing skills: That is, the set of personal qualities that enable 
an individual to thrive in the face of adversity (Connor and 
Davidson 2003). The cultivation of positive emotions has 
been widely found to be an essential coping skill that helps 
people to deal with daily stressors, with important impli-
cations for mental health (Tugade and Fredrickson 2007). 
Accordingly, the habitual use of savoring strategies has been 
associated with higher levels of happiness and well-being 
(Jose et al. 2012; Quoidbach et al. 2010), whereas dampen-
ing (i.e. the use of strategies to downregulate positive affec-
tive experiences) has been linked to prolonged NA levels (Li 
et al. 2017; Wood et al. 2003). This could also explain the 
tendency of depressed patients to retrospectively underesti-
mate PA (Ben-Zeev et al. 2009; Colombo et al. 2019a, b, c), 
which may arguably reflect the inability of these individuals 
to recall positive experiences and upregulate positive emo-
tions (Bryant 2003).
Together, there is evidence suggesting that people’s past-
oriented disposition and, more specifically, the way people 
recall experienced PA, may in itself be a tool to regulate 
current emotions. Consequently, the presence of a recall 
bias may have direct consequences for present affective 
states and, therefore, individuals’ mental health status and 
well-being. In the present study, we explored the potential 
effects of PA recall bias (i.e. the tendency to retrospectively 
overestimate or underestimate positive affective experiences) 
and NA recall bias (i.e. the tendency to retrospectively over-
estimate or underestimate negative affective experiences) 
on mental health outcomes (depressive symptoms, anxiety 
symptoms, and psychological well-being), and we investi-
gated resilience as a potential mechanism (i.e., mediator) 
explaining this relationship. To do so, we asked participants 
to self-report their mood during a two-week Ecological 
Momentary Assessment (EMA) study, and we subsequently 
asked them to retrospectively recall the experienced PA and 
NA levels. We anticipate that PA overestimation will posi-
tively contribute to well-being and will be associated with 
increased resilience. More specifically, we hypothesize PA 
overestimation to positively impact mental health through 
the enhancement of an individual’s resources to cope with 
daily stressors. Conversely, and consistently with the previ-
ous literature (Miron-Shatz et al. 2009), we expect NA over-
estimation to be an evolutionary rather than coping mecha-
nism and, therefore, not be associated with well-being.
Methods
Sample
The sample size was calculated considering the correlations 
as main analyses. Assuming an overall moderate effect size 
of 0.3, a significance level of 5%, a statistical power of 80%, 
and a bilateral contrast, the sample size calculation resulted 
in a sample of n = 82. This study was approved by the eth-
ics committee of Jaume I University (Spain), and informed 
consent was obtained from all participants.
Data were collected from 97 undergraduate students who 
were recruited via online advertisements at Jaume I Univer-
sity (Castellon, Spain). In order to exclude possible con-
founding effects in recalling affective experiences associated 
with the presence of clinical conditions of depression and/
or anxiety, which have been shown to be associated with a 
negative bias (Wenze et al. 2012), we excluded participants 
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with a score above 14 on the Patient Health Question-
naire-9 (PHQ-9) (Kroenke et al. 2001) and/or the General-
ized Anxiety Disorder-7 (GAD-7) (Spitzer et al. 2006), i.e. 
participants with moderately severe disorders. Accordingly, 
5 participants were excluded from the study, thus resulting 
in a final sample of n = 92. The sample was composed of 
69 females (75%) and 23 males (25%). Their mean age was 
21.98 years (min = 18, max = 36; SD = 3.41).
Measures
Depressive Symptoms
Participants’ depressive symptoms were assessed with the 
Spanish adaptation of the PHQ-9 (Diez-Quevedo et  al. 
2001; Kroenke et al. 2001). The PHQ-9 is a 9-item self-
report depression screening measure, that has been shown to 
have good psychometric properties (Wittkampf et al. 2007). 
A score above 15 indicates moderately severe to severe 
depression. In our sample, PHQ-9 internal consistency was 
α = .797.
Anxiety Symptoms
Anxiety symptoms were assessed with the Spanish adapta-
tion of GAD-7 (García-Campayo et al. 2010; Spitzer et al. 
2006). The GAD-7 is a quick self-report questionnaire used 
to identify the presence of minimal, mild, moderate or severe 
anxiety. This scale has shown good internal consistency and 
test–retest reliability, as well as convergent, construct, cri-
terion, procedural, and factorial validity (Löwe et al. 2008). 
In our sample, GAD-7 internal consistency was α = .845.
Retrospective Positive and Negative Affect
Participants were administered the Spanish adaptation 
(Díaz-García et al. 2020) of the Positive and Negative Affect 
Schedule (PANAS) (Watson et al. 1988) in order to retro-
spectively obtain the experienced PA and NA levels dur-
ing the 2-week EMA study. The PANAS is composed of 10 
items to assess PA and 10 items to measure NA. Scores on 
each scale can range from 10 to 50. The PANAS has been 
shown to have good construct validity and reliability (Sandín 
et al. 1999). This scale was administrated at the end of the 
study and referred to the previous two weeks, i.e. the time 
during which the daily EMA measures were being collected. 
In our sample, both PA and NA subscales showed high inter-
nal consistency (PA: α = .918; NA: α = .873).
Resilience
Resilience was assessed using the Spanish adapta-
tion (Notario-Pacheco et  al. 2011) of the 10-item 
Connor-Davidson Resilience Scale (CD-RISC-10) (Camp-
bell-Sills and Stein 2007). This scale is composed of 10 
statements to be rated on a 5-point Likert agreement scale, 
which aim at measuring resilience during the last 30 days. 
Higher total scores indicate greater resilience. The CD-
RISC10 has been shown to have good internal consistency 
(Shin et al. 2018; Singh and Yu 2017). In our sample, the 
CD-RISC-10 showed high internal consistency (α = .843).
Psychological Well‑Being
Psychological well-being was assessed using the Spanish 
adaptation (Díaz-García et al. 2020) of Ryff’s Psychologi-
cal Well-Being Scale (Ryff 2005; Ryff and Keyes 1995). 
This scale explores six different constructs of psychological 
well-being, namely: Autonomy (i.e. an individual’s inde-
pendence from external judgments and social pressures), 
environmental mastery (i.e. one’s ability to take advantage 
of the environment, opportunities, and activities to achieve 
personal needs and goals), personal growth (i.e. the sense 
of continuous self-improvement thanks to life experiences), 
purpose in life (i.e. the sense of meaning in life, which is 
defined by clear beliefs, personal values, and aims), positive 
relations with others (i.e. having satisfactory and trusting 
relationships, as well as owning an empathetic and warm 
attitude towards others), and self-acceptance (i.e. a positive 
attitude toward the current and past self, as well as accept-
ance of both positive and negative personal qualities). This 
scale has been shown to have good psychometric properties 
(van Dierendonck 2004). In our sample, all subscales dem-
onstrated good internal consistency (self-acceptance: = .810; 
positive relation: α = .840; autonomy: α = .758; environmen-
tal mastery: α = .717; personal growth: α = .785; purpose in 
life: α = .709).
Ecological Momentary Affect (EMA) Measures
Two items about momentary affect were rated on the par-
ticipant’s smartphones using “EMA Móvil”, a mobile 
application that allows to administer ecological assess-
ments via smartphones, and that can easily be monitored 
and programmed with a web platform (i.e., no program-
ming skills are needed). At each evaluation, participants 
were asked to complete two 1–5 point Likert scales (1 = not 
at all; 5 = extremely), one evaluating momentary PA (“To 
what extent are you experiencing positive emotions at this 
moment?”) and one evaluating NA (“To what extent are you 
experiencing negative emotions at this moment?”).
Procedure
Participants were recruited via poster advertisements placed 
in different buildings at the university. Students interested 
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in the study were invited to visit the laboratory to receive 
more information about the investigation. During this first 
face-to-face meeting, a researcher administered the PHQ-9 
and the GAD-7 in order to verify that the candidates met the 
inclusion criteria.
Students who met the eligibility criteria were invited to 
sign the informed consent to participate in the study. Subse-
quently, each participant was provided with an identification 
number to download and access the app.
Over the following 14 days, the mobile application “EMA 
Móvil” prompted three daily assessments of momentary PA 
and NA. Participants received one random prompt between 
9:30 am and 2:00 pm, one between 2:00 pm and 6:30 pm, 
and one between 6:30 pm and 11:00 pm (semi-random 
design). To prevent backfilling, participants were given 
sixty minutes to open the notification on their smartphone 
and complete the evaluation. After that period of time, the 
assessment was marked as missing. Participants were pro-
vided with an email to contact the researchers if they needed 
technical support to use the app.
At the end of the study, participants returned to the 
laboratory and completed the PANAS, Ryff’s Psychologi-
cal Well-Being Scale and the CD-RISC-10. Participants 
who completed more than 65% of the total EMA assess-
ments received a compensation of 10 euros. Overall com-
pliance (i.e., percentage of completed assessments) was 
77.8% (SD = 14.12), and 76 out of 92 participants received 
the remuneration. Participants who were not remunerated 
showed compliance rates included between 45 and 65%. No 
dropouts were observed.
Data Analysis
The mean EMA affect score was obtained by calculating 
the means of the PA (“experienced PA”) and NA item 
scores (“experienced NA”) across the study (42 possi-
ble assessments for each participant). To have the same 
range of scores on the EMA affect measures (each scale 
has a 1–5 point range) and the PANAS recall measures 
(each scale originally had a 10-to-50 point range), PANAS 
recall values were divided by the number of items on the 
scale (i.e., 10). Thus, the score ranges for both forms of 
assessment (two weeks of daily, single-item assessments 
with an app and a single retrospective evaluation using the 
full-length scale at the end of the study) were the same 
(1 = lowest affect to 5 = highest affect). In the manuscript, 
we will use the terms “recalled PA” and “recalled NA” 
to refer to the PANAS retrospective scores. To explore 
affect recall bias and distinguish retrospective affect over-
estimation from underestimation, delta scores between 
experienced and recalled PA (“PA bias”) and between 
experienced and recalled NA (“NA bias”) were calculated 
(bias = recalled affect—experienced affect). Positive delta 
scores reflected affect overestimation during the retrospec-
tive assessment, whereas negative delta values reflected 
retrospective affect underestimation.
Kolmogorov–Smirnov test was used to assess normality, 
suggesting that delta PA (D(89) = 0.042, p = .200), Ryff’s 
autonomy subscale (D(89) = 0.072, p = .200) and Ryff’s 
environmental mastery subscale (D(89) = 0.069, p = .200) 
were normally distributed. Parametric or non-parametric 
analyses were adopted, accordingly.
To test the construct validity of the EMA affect items, 
Spearman correlations between experienced and recalled 
PA, and between experienced and recalled NA were per-
formed. Furthermore, Generalized Estimating Equations 
(GEE) (Liang and Zeger 1986) with an unstructured cor-
relation matrix structure and Huber–White standard error 
estimates were used, which are designed to analyze longitu-
dinal repeated-measures data, and to draw inferences by con-
sidering not only variations in affective experience over time 
within individuals, but also variations in affective experience 
between individuals. More specifically, PANAS scores were 
used as predictors of EMA repeated measures.
Experienced and recalled PA and NA scores were com-
pared (Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test) to test the participants’ 
ability to estimate PA and NA retrospectively. Besides, PA 
and NA delta scores were compared using a Wilcoxon’s 
Signed Ranks Test.
Correlations analyses were computed between bias scores 
and mental health outcomes (psychological mental well-
being, depression, and anxiety). Linear regressions were 
also performed to identify PA and NA biases as significant 
predictors of mental health outcomes.
Mediation models were examined using the PROCESS 
macro for SPSS (version 23, model 4) which utilizes a boot-
strap approach to test the hypothesized indirect effect of the 
mediators (Hayes 2012). Each analysis utilized 5000 boot-
strap re-samples and significance was determined based on 
95% bias-corrected confidence intervals. The models tested 
included PA bias scores (independent variables) and mental 
health related outcomes (dependent variables) mediated by 
resilience. We provide estimates of the indirect effects and 
associated confidence intervals for each mediator.
Finally, A Two-Step Cluster Analysis was performed in 
order to identify possible subgroupings based on PA and NA 
biases. Cluster distance was determined using the log-like-
lihood measure and the number of clusters was determined 
automatically using Schwarz’s Bayesian Criterion (BIC). 
The average silhouette measure of cohesion and separation 
was used to indicate overall goodness of fit, and ANOVA 
analysis was performed to further confirm the significant 
differences in PA and NA biases scores among the clus-
ters. A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was 
conducted to explore differences in mental health related 
outcomes among the clusters obtained, and Tukey HSD 
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post-hoc analyses were conducted to explore significant 
differences.
Results
Affect Recall Bias and Mental Health
Detailed information about the recruited sample and the col-
lected measures is reported in Table 1.
Experienced PA (M = 2.69, SD = .68) and recalled PA 
(M = 2.76, SD = .73) were significantly correlated (r = .233, 
p < .05), as well as experienced (M = 1.51, SD = .35) and 
recalled NA (M = 1.92, SD = .65; r = .532, p < .001). Simi-
larly, the NA-PANAS scores significantly predicted NA-
EMA repeated measures (B = 0.032, SD = .005, 95% CI 
[.022, .041], p < .001), while the PA-PANAS scores signifi-
cantly predicted PA-EMA repeated assessments (B = 0.033, 
SD = .008, 95% CI [.018, .049], p < .001).
The comparison of experienced and recalled NA showed 
a significant mean difference in scores (Z = − 6.13, p < .001), 
revealing higher NA scores in the retrospective assessments 
(i.e., NA overestimation during the retrospective evalua-
tion). No significant difference was observed when com-
paring experienced and recalled PA (Z = − .68, p = .496). 
These and the previous findings support the idea that the 
bias might take different forms (i.e., interindividual order or 
average scores) depending on the variable of interest (i.e., 
PA or NA).
Statistically significant differences in rank scores were 
observed between PA bias (M = .074, SD = .85) and NA bias 
scores (M = .415, SD = .55; Z = − 2.94, p < .01). Specifically, 
PA bias scores were equally distributed below (i.e., PA ret-
rospective underestimation: n = 49, M = .701, SD = .568) 
and above 0 (i.e., PA retrospective overestimation: n = 43, 
M = .641, SD = .465), whereas NA bias scores were more 
frequently distributed above 0 (i.e., NA retrospective over-
estimation: n = 71, M = .607, SD = .474; NA retrospective 
underestimation: n = 21, M = − .235, SD = .212).
PA bias was significantly correlated with the PHQ-9 
(r = − .440, p < .001) and GAD-7 scores (r = − .411, 
p < .001), revealing greater PA retrospective overestimation 
in association with lower depressive and anxiety symptoms 
(Table 2). Similarly, delta NA was positively correlated 
with depression (r = .291, p < .001) but not with anxiety 
symptoms (r = .185, p = .077); that is, higher NA retro-
spective overestimation was associated with more severe 
depressive symptoms. Together, delta PA (β = − .441, 
SE = .420, 95% CI [− 2.85, − 1.18]; p < .001) and delta NA 
(β = 0.203, SE = .643, 95% CI [.138, 2.69]; p < .05) sig-
nificantly predicted PHQ-9 scores, explaining 25% of their 
variance (R2 = .247; F (2, 89) = 14.59, p < .001). Delta PA 
(β = − 0.416, SE = .433, 95% CI [− 2.76, − 1.04]; p < .001) 
but not delta NA (β = 0.150, SE = .663, 95% CI [− .267, 
2.37]; p = .117) significantly predicted GAD-7 scores 
(R2 = .203; F (2, 89) = 11.37, p < .001).
Correlation analyses between affect recall bias and mental 
health outcomes are shown in Table 2. Concerning psycho-
logical well-being, delta PA positively correlated with self-
acceptance (r = .432, p < .001), positive relations (r = .383, 
p < .001), environmental mastery (r = .393, p < .001), pur-
pose in life (r = .241, p < .05), and significantly predicted 
several well-being outcomes (self-acceptance: R2 = .17; 
F(1, 87) = 18.28; β = 0.417, SE = .57, 95% CI [1.31, 3.58]; 
p < .001; positive relations: R2 = .13; F(1, 87) = 13.16; 
β = 0.362, SE = .70, 95% CI [1.14, 3.91]; p < .001; envi-
ronmental mastery: R2 = .16; F(1, 87) = 15.9; β = 0.393, 
SE = .55, 95% CI [1.97, 3.28]; p < .001; purpose in life: 
R2 = .07; F(1, 87) = 6.57; β = 0.265, SE = .58, 95% CI [.332, 
2.62]; p < .05). Conversely, delta NA only correlated with 
purpose in life (r = − .222, p < .05), and it did not predict 
any of the well-being measures. Overall, these results sug-
gest that overestimating past PA is associated with higher 
psychological well-being.
Underlying Mechanism of the Relationship Between 
Affect Recall Bias and Psychological Well‑Being
As Table  2 shows, PA bias significantly correlated 
(r = .306, p < .001) and predicted resilience (R2 = .114; F 
Table 1  Frequencies, means, and standard deviations of demograph-
ics, compliance and study measures
PA positive affect, NA negative affect; RYFF’S Ryff’s psychologi-
cal well-being scale, GAD-7 generalized anxiety disorder-7, PHQ-9 
patient health questionnaire-9, CD-RISC-10 Connor-davidson resil-
ience scale-10
Demographics n = 92
Age 22.10 (± 3.58)
Sex 69 female / 23 male
Compliance (%) 77.8 (± 14.12)
Measures
 Recalled PA 2.76 (± .73)
 Recalled NA 1.92 (± .65)
 Experienced PA 2.69 (± .68)
 Experienced NA 1.51 (± .35)
 RYFF’S self-acceptance 26.53 (± 5.07)
 RYFF’S positive relations 27.69 (± 6.03)
 RYFF’S autonomy 33.26 (± 6.61)
 RYFF’S environmental mastery 26.30 (± 4.81)
 RFF’S personal growth 34.46 50)
 RYFF’S purpose in life 27.19 (± 4.81)
 GAD-7 6.52 (± 3.89)
 PHQ-9 6.66 (± 3.88)
 CD-RISC-10 27.53 (± 7.11)
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(2, 87) = 11.18, β = 0.337, SE = .830, 95% CI [1.13, 4.43]; 
p < .001), whereas no significant association was observed 
between NA bias and CD-RISC-10 scores (r = − .195, 
p = .07). In other words, people who overestimated past PA, 
but not those who underestimated past NA, were more resil-
ient. Furthermore, resilience significantly correlated (self-
acceptance: r = .683, p < .001; positive relations: r = .474, 
p < .001; autonomy: r = .497, p < .001; environmental mas-
tery: r = .599, p < .001; personal growth: r = .343, p < .001; 
purpose in life: r = .613, p < .001) and predicted psychologi-
cal well-being (self-acceptance: R2 = .42; F(1, 87) = 63.73; 
β = 0.650, SE = .06, 95% CI [.349, .580]; p < .001; positive 
relations: R2 = .22; F(1, 87) = 24.45; β = 0.468, SE = .08, 
95% CI [.238, .557]; p < .001; autonomy: R2 = .25; F(1, 
87) = 28.67; β = 0.498, SE = .09, 95% CI [.291, .635]; 
p < .001; environmental mastery: R2 = .33; F(1, 87) = 42.37; 
β = 0.572, SE = .06, 95% CI [.269, .505]; p < .001; personal 
growth: R2 = .11; F(1, 87) = 11.14; β = 0.337, SE = .06, 
95% CI [.086, .340]; p < .001; purpose in life: R2 = .35; 
F(1, 87) = 46.14; β = 0.589, SE = .06, 95% CI [.282, .516]; 
p < .001). As significant correlations were observed between 
PA bias, CD-RISC-10, and four well-being measures (i.e., 
self-acceptance, positive relations, environmental mastery, 
purpose in life), we explored whether resilience significantly 
mediated the association between PA bias and well-being 
using the PROCESS macro for SPSS (version 23, model 4), 
which utilizes a bootstrap approach to test the hypothesized 
indirect effect of the mediators (Hayes 2012). Significant 
indirect effects are represented in Fig. 1.
According to the results, a significant indirect effect of 
PA bias on psychological well-being through resilience 
was observed: Self-acceptance (unstandardized indirect 
effect = 1.14, 95% CI [.44, 1.91]), positive relations (unstand-
ardized indirect effect = .92, 95% CI [.34, 1.63]), environ-
mental mastery (unstandardized indirect effect = .093, 95% 
CI [.38, 1.53]), and purpose in life (unstandardized indirect 
effect = 1.06, 95% CI [.42, 1.79]). Together, these analyses 
reveal that resilience partially mediates the effect of PA bias 
on psychological well-being.
The Combination of PA and NA Recall Biases 
on Mental Health
A Two-Step Cluster Analysis was conducted to detect poten-
tial subgroupings based on PA and NA bias scores (average 
Silhoutte = 0.5). Four clusters were identified, which showed 
statistically different PA and NA bias values (PA bias: F 
(3,88) = 89.03, p < .001; NA bias: F (3,88) = 25.31, p < .001): 
(1) The “double bias” cluster (n = 19; PA bias = − 1.06; NA 
bias = .59) included individuals who retrospectively underes-
timated PA and tended to overestimate NA; (2) the “negative 
bias” cluster (n = 30; PA bias = .10; NA bias = .81) included 
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estimating PA, but overestimated NA; (3) the “accurate” 
cluster (n = 21; PA bias = − .06; NA bias = − .18) included 
individuals who were quite accurate in retrospectively esti-
mating both PA and NA; (4) the “positive bias” cluster 
(n = 22; PA bias = 1.14; NA bias = .29) included individuals 
who were quite accurate in retrospectively estimating NA, 
but that overestimated PA.
MANOVA analyses were performed to explore differ-
ences in mental health measures among the four clusters 
(Table 3), and a statistically significant effect was observed 
(Wilks’ Lambda = .634, F (24, 226.825) = 1.607, p < .05). 
There were statistically significant differences among 
the four groups in terms of depressive symptoms (F (3, 
93.1) = 7.56, p < .001). A Tukey HSD post hoc analysis 
revealed that the “positive bias” group reported signifi-
cantly lower depression levels compared to the “double 
bias” (p < .001) and “negative bias” groups (p < .01). Sig-
nificant differences in anxiety scores were also observed 
among the four groups (F (3, 76.23) = 5.99, p < .001). The 
post hoc analysis indicated that the “positive bias” group 
reported significantly lower anxiety levels than the “double 
bias” (p < .001) and “negative bias” clusters (p < .05). No 
significant differences were observed between the “double 
bias” and “negative bias” groups.
Besides, significant differences were observed on self-
acceptance (F (3, 167.83) = 8.10, p < .001), positive rela-
tions (F (3, 107.25) = 3.17, p < .05), environmental mastery 
(F (3, 122.39) = 6.25, p < .001) and purpose in life (F (3, 
77.14) = 3.63, p < .05). More specifically, the “positive bias” 
cluster reported significantly higher scores than the “double 
bias” cluster on self-acceptance (p < .001), positive relations 
(p < .05), environmental mastery (p < .001) and purpose in 
life (p < .05), and higher values on self-acceptance (p < .05) 
and environmental mastery (p < .05) when compared to the 
“negative bias” group. Notably, the “positive bias” cluster 
also showed higher well-being scores when compared to the 
“accurate group” on two of the well-being subscales (self-
acceptance: p < .01; environmental mastery: p < .01). Again, 
no significant differences were observed between the “dou-
ble bias” and “negative bias” groups.
Discussion
In the present study, we explored affect recall bias by com-
paring daily to retrospective assessments of affect. Consist-
ent with the previous literature, participants tended to over-
estimate negative affective experiences. Nevertheless, we did 
not find the general PA retrospective overestimation that was 
observed in previous studies (Ben-Zeev et al. 2009; Hedges 
et al. 1985). Specifically, in our sample, half of the partici-
pants were likely to overestimate past PA, but the other half 
were likely to underestimate it. This divergent result may 
be due to the novel assessment approach used in the present 
study (i.e., EMA using a smartphone app) (Colombo et al. 
2019a, b, c), but also to the characteristics of the recruited 
sample, which included mildly depressed/anxious students. 
In relation to the latter, despite reporting a similar NA over-
estimation pattern, depressed individuals have been shown 
to overestimate PA to a lesser extent (Ben-Zeev et al. 2009) 
or even to underestimate it (Colombo et al. 2019a, b, c). 
Accordingly, it is possible that the presence of participants 
with mild symptoms influenced the results observed in this 
study, increasing the variability of PA bias distribution and 
leading to an equal number of overestimators and underes-
timators. This hypothesis cannot be confirmed at this stage 
and will require further investigation.
An interesting finding in the present study was that PA 
bias correlated and predicted mental health outcomes. More 
specifically, PA underestimation was associated with higher 
Fig. 1  Standardized regression coefficients for the relationship between PA bias and well-being measures as mediated by resilience
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depression and anxiety symptoms, which confirms a recent 
meta-analysis that pointed out no significant differences in 
the effect sizes of reduced PA levels in depressed and anx-
ious patients (Khazanov and Ruscio 2016). Additionally, PA 
overestimation correlated with and predicted higher levels 
of psychological well-being (self-acceptance, environmental 
mastery, purpose in life and positive relations), thus sup-
porting the hypothesis that overestimating past positive 
affective experiences is likely to be an adaptive strategy 
that positively impacts many dimensions of mental health. 
Notably, an indirect effect of PA bias on psychological well-
being through resilience was observed: In other words, our 
results suggest that the tendency to overestimate PA does 
not directly affect mental health, but instead adds up to the 
set of personal qualities that people use to face adversities 
(Connor and Davidson 2003) and indirectly enhances mental 
health. Consistent with the broaden-and-build theory (Fre-
drickson and Joiner 2002; Tugade and Fredrickson 2007), 
these results confirm the idea that cultivating positive emo-
tions is a fundamental tool for the enhancement of resilience 
(Herrero et al. 2019).
Besides, NA bias correlated with and predicted the pres-
ence of mild depressive symptoms. Our results are coherent 
with a long tradition of research showing the presence of a 
negative bias in depressed patients, which involves increased 
elaboration of negative information, recall of more negative 
memories than positive ones, and difficulties in disengag-
ing from negative information (Gaddy and Ingram 2014; 
Gotlib and Joormann 2010). Accordingly, the tendency to 
overestimate negative emotional experiences may reflect the 
negative bias that it is usually reported by depressed people 
(Craske and Pontillo 2001), and it may be already observable 
in individuals with mild symptoms. However, the direction 
of the association between depression and the negative bias 
remains an open question, and the correlational nature of our 
results does not allow to disentangle whether the presence of 
mild depressive symptoms provokes a negative bias or the 
other way around. Notably, NA bias only barely correlated 
with one of the Ryff’s well-being dimensions and it was not 
significantly associated with resilience. In addition, almost 
all the participants in our sample tended to overestimate past 
NA, and only a few people underestimated it. In other words, 
NA bias does not seem to have regulatory or coping func-
tions, but it may rather be a “normal” tendency of individu-
als. Thus, whereas people appear to overestimate past PA 
to cope with daily stressors, they are not likely to use NA 
underestimation to feel better and deal with negative events.
In the present study, we also conducted an exploratory 
cluster analysis to investigate whether the combination of 
biases could lead to different associations with the out-
come measures. Interestingly, participants in the “double 
bias” cluster (i.e., PA underestimation and NA overestima-
tion) reported the poorest mental health status (in terms of 
Table 3  MANOVA comparisons of depressive symptoms, anxiety 
symptoms and psychological well-being in the four clusters
PHQ-9 patient health questionnaire-9, GAD-7 generalized anxiety 
disorder-7
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
Group Mean SD Tukey HSD comparisons (mean dif-
ference)
Double bias Negative bias Accurate
PHQ-9
 Double bias 9.00 3.68
 Negative bias 7.18 3.23 − 1.82
 Accurate 6.35 3.86 − 2.65 − .83
 Positive bias 3.91 3.35 − 5.09*** − 3.27** − 2.44
GAD-7
 Double bias 8.74 3.91
 Negative bias 6.71 3.46 − 2.02
 Accurate 6.30 3.86 − 2.44 − .41
 Positive bias 4.05 3.35 − 4.69*** − 2.67* − 2.25
Self-acceptance
 Double bias 23.42 4.64
 Negative bias 26.71 4.71 3.29
 Accurate 25.25 2.76 1.83 − 1.46
 Positive bias 30.14 2.64 6.72*** 3.42* 4.89**
Positive relations
 Double bias 25.74 5.76
 Negative bias 27.89 5.67 2.16
 Accurate 26.00 7.63 .26 − 1.89
 Positive bias 30.64 3.81 4.90* 2.74 4.64
Autonomy
 Double bias 31.00 6.77
 Negative bias 33.07 5.45 2.07
 Accurate 32.95 7.65 1.95 − .12
 Positive bias 35.73 6.43 4.73 2.66 2.78
Environmental mastery
 Double bias 24.11 3.91
 Negative bias 26.04 4.45 1.93
 Accurate 25.10 5.56 .99 − .94
 Positive bias 29.64 3.57 5.53*** 3.60* 4.54**
Personal growth
 Double bias 33.89 4.83
 Negative bias 34.21 4.12 .32
 Accurate 34.35 5.85 .46 .14
 Positive bias 35.3 3.77 1.47 1.15 1.01
Purpose in life
 Double bias 25.32 4.53
 Negative bias 26.54 4.96 1.22
 Accurate 27.00 4.92 1.68 .46
 Positive bias 29.82 3.86 4.50* 3.28 2.82
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depression, anxiety and psychological well-being). These 
scores were clearly worse than participants in the “posi-
tive bias” group (i.e., PA overestimation), but also slightly, 
yet not significantly worse than participants in the “nega-
tive bias” group (i.e., NA overestimation, PA accuracy). 
Although the latter differences were not statistically signifi-
cant, these results and the marked differences with the “posi-
tive bias” group suggest that the concurrent overestimation 
of NA and underestimation of PA might potentially repre-
sent an important vulnerability factor for mental health. Due 
to the small sample size of each cluster, future studies are 
needed to confirm this hypothesis, which might open new 
avenues for research, prevention and treatment purposes. 
Another interesting finding was that people who tended to 
overestimate past positive emotions benefited from higher 
psychological well-being (self-acceptance and environmen-
tal mastery), even when compared to individuals who were 
almost accurate in retrieving their affect (“accurate” cluster). 
Despite representing a cognitive bias, we therefore suggest 
that the overestimation of past positive affective experiences 
can be considered an adaptive distortion of reality.
For many decades, accurate predictions have been consid-
ered a marker of mental health: Cognitive distortions or non-
accurate representations of reality were considered vulnera-
bility factors for psychopathology (Jahoda 1953). Consistent 
with the information processing perspective, humans were 
regarded as scientists gathering and elaborating information 
from the environment with the aim of building realistic and 
accurate pictures of the world (Fischhoff 1975). The Positive 
Illusion Theory offered a divergent perspective, suggesting 
that cognitive biases are adaptive in many circumstances 
(Taylor and Brown 1988), and our results are consistent with 
this latter idea.
According to Taylor and Brown (1988), people are likely 
to report three positive biases: Unrealistically positive views 
of the self, exaggerated perceptions of control, and unreal-
istic optimism. Rather than representing processing errors, 
these positive biases have been shown to be protective fac-
tors for mental health (i.e., useful resources to maintain 
and promote well-being and happiness). Consistent with 
this perspective, a growing body of studies has focused on 
the importance of a future-oriented disposition (Colombo 
et al. 2020a, b) and, more specifically, the repercussions that 
future perception has on mental health (Mikus et al. 2017; 
Weinstein 1980). Accordingly, a new construct called “open-
ness to the future” has been proposed, which refers to the 
“positive expectations about what life may bring, a sense of 
competence and ability to cope with events, the anticipa-
tion, planning and perseverance to reach an outcome even 
in the face of adversity, and the acceptance of what can-
not be resolved or predicted”. Similar to Taylor’s positive 
biases (1988), openness to the future has been shown to be 
a protective factor for well-being, and it has been associated 
with higher PA levels, psychological well-being, and self-
esteem, as well as with reduced depressive symptoms, anxi-
ety, and worry (Botella et al. 2018). Here, we propose that 
also people’s past-oriented disposition may represent an 
important protective factor for mental health. Building on 
our results, we showed that the way we perceive and recall 
our past experiences is associated with many mental health 
related dimensions. More specifically, overestimating past 
affective experiences is likely to be a protective factor asso-
ciated with greater well-being. Conversely, the tendency 
to underestimate PA and strongly overestimate NA might 
potentially represent a risk factor for mental health, although 
the direction of this association cannot be clarified due to the 
observational nature of the design.
In relation to the previous, there is evidence suggesting 
that, while experiencing both positive and negative emo-
tional states is adaptive and essential for survival, dysregu-
lated NA levels along with reduced PA can be associated 
with the onset of many emotional disorders (Hofmann et al. 
2012). From an evolutionary perspective, NA entails the 
implementation of avoidance or withdrawal behaviors in 
the face of challenging and dangerous situations, whereas 
PA fosters approach behaviors and the exploration of novel 
situations (Cacioppo and Berntson 1999). It is therefore 
possible to hypothesize that owning distorted emotional 
representations could affect an individual’s behaviors and 
attitude towards the external world. Accordingly, the concur-
rent overestimation of NA and underestimation of PA may 
lead to avoid new experiences and to focus more on negative 
rather than positive stimuli, which in turn may discourage 
positive attitudes such as exploration and curiosity.
From a clinical point of view, these results might have 
some important implications. Reduced PA is indeed a core 
component of anhedonia, which in turn is a vulnerability 
factor for mental health. Furthermore, altered levels of both 
NA and PA has been found to account for the onset and 
maintenance of many emotional disorders (Brown 2007; 
Brown and Barlow 2009). However, the primary focus of 
most of the available interventions has been placed on the 
reduction of symptoms and on the alleviation of negative 
emotional states. Considering the growing literature show-
ing the short- and long-terms benefits of PA on health and 
mental health (Pressman et al. 2018), more efforts should be 
made in order to create interventions that focus on increasing 
PA levels and learning strategies to regulate not only nega-
tive emotions, but also positive ones. An example in this 
direction is the Positive Affect Treatment, which focuses 
specifically on the enhancement of PA. In a recent rand-
omized controlled trial, the authors revealed better clinical 
outcomes in terms of depression, affect, anxiety, stress, and 
suicidal ideation in the group of patients receiving Positive 
Affect Treatment, compared to a Negative Affect Treatment 
(Craske et al. 2019). Additionally, a possible future line of 
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research could lie in the self-monitoring of daily affect and 
ER deployment in relation to positive emotions by means 
of a smartphone based EMA similar to the one used in the 
present investigation. Symptom self-monitoring has already 
been shown to be an efficacious tool to increase awareness 
and self-empowerment in depressed patients, leading to 
decreased symptoms and fewer maladaptive behaviors 
(Simons et al. 2015; Snippe et al. 2016). Consistently, it 
is possible that monitoring daily affect and related emo-
tion regulation strategies increases people’s awareness of 
experienced positive and negative emotions. Along this line, 
Sharot (2011) showed that individuals tend to update their 
predictions when provided with a piece of information that is 
positive rather than negative (i.e., when the information pro-
vides a more optimistic perspective on the prediction made). 
This updating process appears to produce optimism that is 
resistant to change. Similarly, providing a feedback about 
daily experienced emotions may lead habitual PA underesti-
mators to update their predictions to more closely match the 
real affect experienced, thus reducing the PA bias.
Although this study deepens our knowledge about affect 
bias and its relationship with mental health, we acknowledge 
several limitations that could be addressed in future research. 
An important aspect that needs to be considered is content 
validity. Although the single items we used to assess PA 
and NA via EMA significantly correlated with and predicted 
affect scores, it would be necessary to replicate this finding 
in a larger population in order to guarantee content validity. 
In addition, the PANAS consists of 10 items to assess PA 
and 10 items to evaluate NA. Conversely, we used single 
items to collect momentary measures of PA and NA because 
of the daily, repeated nature of the ecological assessments. 
It is possible that a complex construct like affect might be 
grasped differently when using 10 items as opposed to one 
item. While acknowledging this, it is important to note that 
it would have been too demanding for users to complete the 
20 items on the PANAS three times a day for 2 weeks. Simi-
lar to other studies (Suso-Ribera et al. 2018), we decided 
to use single items in order to manage the difficulties in 
obtaining high adherence rates when dealing with EMA 
research (Desirée Colombo et al. 2018). Additionally, the 
indirect effects of recall bias on mental well-being observed 
in this study should be considered with caution, consider-
ing the cross-sectional nature of data (Maxwell and Cole 
2007). Further studies are needed to confirm the causal role 
of PA bias on Ryff’s measures through resilience. Finally, 
further limitations are related to the nature of our sample, 
which was mainly female and composed of undergradu-
ate students, and that also included individuals with mild 
depressive symptoms. An important goal for future research 
would include investigating whether affect recall is affected 
by sex and whether different patterns can be observed in 
relation to age. According to the “positivity effect”, indeed, 
old individuals as compared to younger ones are likely to 
recall more positive than negative information (Carstensen 
and DeLiema 2018; Reed and Carstensen 2012). It would 
be therefore important to explore whether the benefits of 
holding biased representations of past emotional experiences 
entail the same implications in different populations.
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